UNDERSTANDING LIFE IN THE BORDERLANDS

EDITED BY I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN

BOUNDARIES IN DEPTH AND IN MOTION
UNDERSTANDING LIFE IN THE BORDERLANDS
This page intentionally left blank
This page intentionally left blank
UNDERSTANDING LIFE IN THE BORDERLANDS

Boundaries in Depth and in Motion

EDITED BY

I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN

The University of Georgia Press
Athens and London
To CAORC and all its AORCs
For their great contribution to interdisciplinary knowledge
And intercultural understanding
This page intentionally left blank
CONTENTS

Acknowledgments xi

INTRODUCTION. Identity, Movement, and Response 1
I. William Zartman, The Johns Hopkins University

Part I. Structures in Evolution

CHAPTER ONE. Borderland Dynamics in the Era of the Pyramid Builders in Egypt 21
Miroslav Bártá, Charles University

CHAPTER TWO. Conflict and Control on the Ottoman-Greek Border 40
George Gavrilis, University of Texas at Austin

CHAPTER THREE. Illicit Trade and the Emergence of Albania and Yemen 58
Isa Blumi, Georgia State University

CHAPTER FOUR. On the Margin of Statehood? State-Society Relations in African Borderlands 85
Judith Vorrath, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich

CHAPTER FIVE. Change and Non-change in the U.S.-Mexican Borderlands after NAFTA 105
David Stea, Jamie Zech, and Melissa Gray, Texas State University–San Marcos

Part II. Identities in Transition

CHAPTER SIX. Colonialism or Conviviencia in Frankish Cyprus? 133
James G. Schryver, University of Minnesota, Morris

CHAPTER SEVEN. Constructing National Identity in Ottoman Macedonia 160
İpek K. Yosmaoğlu, University of Wisconsin–Madison
CHAPTER EIGHT. Pioneers and Refugees: Arabs and Jews in the Jordan River Valley 189
Rachel S. Havrelock, University of Illinois at Chicago

CHAPTER NINE. Who’s Who across the U.S.-Mexico Border: Identities in Transition 217
Harriett Romo and Raquel R. Márquez, University of Texas at San Antonio

CHAPTER TEN. Looking across the Horizon 235
Shelley Feldman, Cornell University

CONCLUSION. Borderland Policy: Keeping Up with Change 245
I. William Zartman, The Johns Hopkins University

References 251
Contributors 279
Index 283
CAORC is the federation of twenty-three American Overseas Research Centers located in five continents. The centers, structured as consortia of American universities, colleges, and museums, sponsor advanced research by American and host-country scholars, primarily through fellowships for pre- and postdoctoral scholars focusing on projects in the humanities and social sciences, and their work in the field is gratefully acknowledged as a basis for this project.

The Borderlands Interdisciplinary Project (BLIP) began with a discussion in the Board of Directors’ meeting of the Council of American Overseas Research Centers (CAORC) concerning converging research interests of scholars funded by CAORC member institutions. CAORC vice-chairman I. William Zartman, a political scientist representing “modern” studies, and CAORC Executive Committee member-at-large Kenneth Sams, a classical archaeologist, examined the list of scholars and their topics for the previous three-year period and identified three prevailing themes: gender studies, identity, and borderland studies, selecting the third as the theme of the first Interdisciplinary Project. Of the fifteen scholars originally identified in the CAORC fellowship database, seven are represented in this volume: Miroslav Bártá, Associate Professor, Charles University, Prague, funded by CAORC’s Andrew W. Mellon East-Central European Fellows Program to carry out research at the Albright Institute of Archaeological Research; Isa Blumi, doctoral candidate, CAORC Multi-country Fellowship Program funded by the U.S. Department of State for residence at American Research Institute in Turkey; James G. Schryver, doctoral candidate, at the Cyprus American Archaeological Research Institute, funded by the Fulbright Program; İpek Yosmaoğlu, doctoral candidate, Princeton University, at the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, funded by the Frantz Fellowship; and Shelley Feldman, Professor, Cornell University, at the American Institute of Bangladesh Studies; George Gavrilis, doctoral candidate, Columbia University, at the American Research Institute in Turkey; and Rachel S. Havrelock, doctoral candidate, University of California, Berkeley, at the American Center of Oriental Research, Amman, the last three funded by the Department of State.
Melissa Gray, Raquel R. Márquez, Harriett Romo, David Stea, and Jamie Zech joined the project through the Mexico-North Research Network. Judith Vorrath was funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation. Their various sources of support are gratefully acknowledged by the recipients and by CAORC.

We are all most grateful to the Council of American Overseas Research Centers, under the dynamic leadership of Dr. Mary Ellen Lane, for its broad and farsighted support for this project, the first of a series of Interdisciplinary and Inter-Center Studies. We are also deeply grateful for the skilled assistance of Isabelle Talpain-Long for her meticulous editorial work and liaison with the authors. Cecily Brewer also carefully compiled the bibliography and Joshua Scharff the index.
This page intentionally left blank
INTRODUCTION

Identity, Movement, and Response

I. William Zartman

Borders run across land but through people. On maps they appear as fine one-dimensional lines, whereas on the ground they have many dimensions. Borderlands are boundaries in depth, space around a line, the place where state meets society, and “where no one ever feels at home” (Simon 1997). They are a terra de pas (footlands or steplands) to Catalonians and “the third country” to Mexican Americans. In human terms, it is impossible to understand borders, and indeed the peripheral relations between the states and societies they contain—without understanding how it is to live along them. The core of that understanding, as this work shows, is found in a recognition of the distinct identity and dynamics of borderland communities and the realization that any measures to deal with specific current dynamics contain within themselves the seeds of new dynamic problems.

The various academic definitions (since academics rarely stick to one definition) all stress the effect that borders have on our lives. Borderlands are “subnational areas whose economic and social life is directly and significantly affected by proximity to an international boundary” (Hansen 1981) or, more extensively, “zones of varying widths, in which people have recognizable configurations of relationships to people inside that zone, on both sides of the borderline but within the cultural landscape of the borderlands, and, as people of the border, special relationships with other people and institutions in their respective nations and states” (Donnan and Wilson 1994, 8). This collection of case studies is an attempt to begin to understand both these areas and the interactions that occur within and across them. It is an attempt to understand how borders affect the groups living near them.
Borderlands are inhabited territories located on the margins of a power center, or between power centers, with power understood in the civilizational as well as the politico-economic sense. But like the sea at the edge of the land (and the reverse), they are continually in movement, both fast and slow, and any static depiction of the moment contains within it the elements of its change—Kokoschka in motion, to build on the image of Ernest Gellner (1983, 140). It is that dynamic quality that is the message of this collective interdisciplinary study. Borderlands need to be understood, not as places or even events, but as social processes.

There is an enormous literature on interstate boundaries as lines, and much literature on secessional territories bounded by lines. But until relatively recently there was little attempt to understand the nature of the land and people abutting on and divided by the boundary—the boundary in depth or borderlands. The collective work edited by Frederick Barth (1969) on ethnic groups and boundaries launched the field of study and led scholars to investigate the human condition in regions split by state sovereignty. The focus was above all on ways of maintaining identity under challenge from other identity groups or changing situations (Barth 1969, 127, 132). Whereas previous studies in the social sciences tended to focus on communities within states, so as to hold one variable constant, or on comparisons of different communities in different states, so as to analyze the differences, the new field of inquiry concerned transborder communities affected by a political line imposed on them. In most cases, these studies (such as the larger studies behind the individual chapters in this volume) concentrated on one locale, exploring and developing concepts on the basis of a single community; edited works (such as the present study) brought together a number of such studies to compare cases and construct concepts. But as Thomas Wilson and Hastings Donnan (1998, 5) point out, “Regardless of theoretical orientation or locale, however, most of these studies have focused on how social relations, defined in part by the state, transcend the physical limits of the state and, in so doing, transform the structure of the state at home and its relations with its neighbours.”

The presence of borderlands is not dependent on the existence of a particular type of power center or state. Borderlands have existed during all times. Whenever there have been political communities so large that distinctions could be made between the power center and a periphery far enough away from it to be able to enjoy some degree of difference and autonomy, relations between center and periphery tended to be counterbalanced by relations between neighbor-
ing peripheries or by relations within the autonomous periphery. Empires both ancient and modern, cultural blocs and civilizational areas, and evolving states even from the pre-Westphalian era all have had their borderlands. The phenomenon is sharpened by the territorial state, a Western invention, established by the Romans and revived after 1648 in the Westphalian system. In the territorial state, the political boundary is imposed on the population regardless of its social structure—in a process sometimes termed “territoriality” (Winichakul 1994, 14)—and has an important influence on that structure as a result. But borderlands can also be found on the edges of a communitarian state, whose writ runs wherever its people are, not where its territorial limits end, but whose people mingle with other communitarian states’ people as minorities. In the communitarian state, the social and political boundaries coincide, at least in theory, although even the purest community can contain subcommunities within it or give rise to forces that seek to define the pure community in a way offensive to another part of the same community.

The phenomenon is further heightened by the nation-state. The broadest sociopolitical structure or community is called a nation, marked most strongly by a sense of identity and more loosely by other structural and cultural characteristics. Since the rise of nationalism at the end of the eighteenth century, there is a presumed coincidence between the state and its nation, but this coincidence can run in either of two directions. Originally the presumption has been one of a nation-state, in which the pre-existence of the identitarian community defines the existence, legitimacy, and limits of the political institution. However, more recently new states have been created, usually as a result of anticolonial nationalist movements, with the need to unite a number of component traditional nations into a state nation, a new identity community that coincides with the political unit. In both directions, however, the coincidence of state and nation is a best approximate, and nowhere more approximate than at their edges, where the official presumption is quite the opposite—one of sharp distinctions with neighboring nations and states.

Borders, even political borders, have a social aspect. Social communities can exist in relation to the political border in other forms than as coterminous nation and state—as majoritarian communities that spill over as majorities into a neighboring state, as majoritarian communities that spill over as minorities into a neighboring state, as communities that exist as minorities on both sides of a border, and as minority communities that do not hang over across a political border (cf. Wilson and Donnan 1998, 14). The political border may or
may not contain or correspond to a social boundary, defined as a “criteri[on] for determining . . . and . . . signaling membership and exclusion, . . . for judg[ing] value and performance, . . . [and for] mark[ing] difference in behavior” (Barth 1969, 15) or a “zone of contrasting identity, rapid transition, or separation” (Tilly 2004, 3; Abbott 1995).

But not all border and transborder activities are performed by ethnic groups or other social units, whether as local minorities or as the dominant community within their state. Transborder activities and the general dynamics that they produce can be performed by socioeconomic categories, such as professions, occupations, or classes, with little sense of identity and membership in diverse communities or identity groups. Indeed, some of these activities, such as smuggling, taking refuge, or guarding borders, create their own agents and would not exist were it not for the border. Although studies may focus on one sort of group or another for analytical purposes, full reality can be a jumble of actors, understandable only as a mesh. All social life is, of course, such a mesh, but such a mixture of levels, actors, activities, and identities may be most pronounced when activated by the intrusion of the division constituted by a state boundary line. In sum, borders are not simply passive agents but can act on groups, encouraging the development of separate identities.

As a result, the rising study of borderlands has been undertaken by several disciplines. The most active has been anthropology, which claims Barth as its scoutmaster, orienting its analysis on social and cultural borders and on the bounded units’ efforts to maintain their identity. Much of the anthropological work showed borderlands to be areas where the sharpness of ethnic and other cultural limits and differentiations clashed with the groups’ need to interact with other groups on the other side of the dividing lines. As a result, walls and moats tend to dissolve into hills and marshes, with their own syncretic characteristics. Such understanding has come to replace the initial study of boundaries, in line or in depth, as conducted by geographers, whose focus was on the moats and walls themselves (Boggs 1940). Human geographers supplemented the work of physical geographers by broadening the notions of natural and artificial boundaries to relate to social criteria as well as topographical criteria. Political scientists have added a concern with the state as the defining agent of boundaries and of relations of authority, identity, transaction, and organization behind them; lawyers have sought to relate the line to the law (Brownlie 1979). The state, however, is not a featureless terrain, but rather a set of relationships between center and periphery, where the functional features of the latter
Introduction

often coincide with the physical location of borderlands. On the other hand, some borderlands are conceived by their inhabitants as proto-states, peripheries seeking to break off from the center to form their own center (with its own peripheries). All of these features have been woven through borderlands’ analytical chronologies supplied by historians of specific areas, bringing to light the diachronic characteristics of world events on the fringes of states, empires, and civilizations.

The purpose of the Borderlands Interdisciplinary Project (BLIP) of the Council of American Overseas Research Centers (CAORC) is to draw out conceptual characteristics of the human condition in borderlands across enormous variations in time, in development, and in history. These characteristics involve such dimensions of life as identity, socioeconomic relations, power exercise and relations, security, and culture. While the technology of the times has its effects, it is not likely to affect the basics of these dimensions, which are at least relevantly comparable across time. Such multidimensionality of the human condition in borderlands, however, demands an equally multifaceted analytical approach, an interdisciplinarity that sets this collective enterprise apart from most other borderland studies. While the individual studies presented here have often originated in a particular discipline, the whole is broader than its parts and thereby richer, since the parts are obliged to take into account elements that are prominent in other chapters in the work. Anthropology, history, political science, religious studies, and archaeology join together in their particular contributions to the subject, and in addition several of the authors have multi- or interdisciplinary identities and points of view. The result, then, is not undisciplined but truly multidisciplinary, with different analytical approaches enriching the combined understanding by building on each other.

Borders and Borderlands

The nature and conditions of the borderland is affected by the nature of the border itself. The border is an artificial—that is, man-made, political—line running through the region. Borders can be sharp, clear, deep lines where the political line is reinforced by “natural” distinctions in terms of physical and human geography, that is, where populations are clearly different on either side of the line and where they are thinned out by clearly marked, less inhabitable distinctions such as natural walls and moats, mountain ridges, or water bodies. Or they can be indistinguishable on the ground, corresponding to no natural features, pene-
trable, uncontrolled; indeed, in the extreme, the border can be the region itself, a buffer state or neutral zone controlled by neither side and tolerated by both. Borders, according to Strassoldo, “divide and unite, bind the interior and link with the exterior, [as] barriers and junctions, walls and doors, organs of defense and attack. Frontier areas (borderlands) can be managed as to maximize either of such functions. They can be militarized, as bulwarks against neighbors, or made into areas of peaceful interchange” (Strassoldo 1989, 393). Two characteristics of the border are salient, its political nature and its depth. Political means its relation to the power center, the strength of the force and authority behind it, the degree of enforcement that sustains it, the will and capacity to maintain the artificial division running through a populated area. Borders can be backed by weak states, undemarcated and unadministered, or can be forcibly asserted and maintained by a strong central authority running its writ to the ends of its earth, or some condition in between these two extremes.

Depth refers to the degree of difference occurring in that area between the two sides of the border. Again, the line can be merely a political imposition, resting lightly on an undifferentiated population that largely ignores the attempt to separate their sameness, or it can correspond to pre-existing or rapidly adopted distinctions of identity, based on language, religion, culture, ethnicity, history, race, and other things that make people think themselves different from the Other. The U.S.-Canada border is not very deep; it does not divide much except customs officials and tax forms, whereas the Iron Curtain was much, much deeper, and where it was not naturally deep, as between East and West Germany, it made itself so by creating new distinctions between people on either side. Interestingly, even borders that purport to be very deep, such as the Israeli or Cypriot Green Lines, the Korean DMZ or the Kashmiri LOC, the U.S.-Mexico border, or the border between apartheid South Africa and the Front Line States, turn out to be more disruptive than separative for the borderlands and less deep than authorities might wish. The deepest boundaries are places where civilizations meet, clash, and then draw a truce, between historical, religiously backed empires.

People in borderlands are living on the edge, meeting people living on the edge on the other side of the border, in constantly—if gradually—changing relationships. These three conditions comprise the defining characteristics of borderlands—a population on the margins of power centers, traversed by a formal political boundary, living dynamic relations internally and externally (with the power center).
But change is within something, from something to something, not unidentifiable chaos, and it is the further task of this study to identify some of these patterns. The situations that frame the dynamics of change can be expressed in three possible spatial models for social relations in borderlands: black-and-white, grey, and some intermediate types—spotty, buffered, and layered, as well as mixtures of the three (cf. Barth 1969, 19–20; Strassoldo 1989; Martinez 1994).

1. The black-and-white model pictures a sharp distinction between two different peoples along a clear borderline running through the borderlands, the closed border with alienated borderlands in Martinez’s (1994) terms. The “different” people are self-defining; whether they are “really” (objectively) different is less important than their feeling different, although there is likely to be some objective fact on which subject feelings are based. The separation in the situation requires some sort of border, although it can be formal or informal, externally or internally drawn. In this model, borderland populations are cohesive outposts of the respective power center, inherently hostile in their transborder relations, lacking cross-border interaction, knowledge, and communication, and protected in their security and self-image by the hostility between the two power centers. The situation in contemporary Cyprus is a good example of this model, as were relations along the Iron Curtain. Images and in some periods reality along the nineteenth-century Ottoman Balkan border are also examples.

2. The grey model is quite opposite, with the different populations fully intermingled, whether they feel “different” or not. This is a model of integration, producing an intermediate population and culture composed of a combination of traits and people from the two sides. Borders may still exist but they are permeable, making cultures permeated too. The Tex-Mex border, Schleswig-Holstein between Germany and Denmark, and Alsace, where German and French cultures overlap, are examples marked by hybrid cultures. Balkan reality in periods of the nineteenth century and African reality in the twentieth century often took a grey form in reaction to the official black-and-white policy.

3a. The other three models fall between the two extremes. The buffered model is an extreme form of the grey model: a different culture is located between the two main cultures/populations to insulate them from one another, distinct in its characteristics and established for the internal or external purpose of keeping the two populations separate. Hybrid cultures have evolved, or third groups
are strategically placed separating opposing power centers. Serbs placed in the Krajina by the Austrians to separate the Croats from the Ottoman Muslim populations constitute one example among many.

3b. The spotty model has islands of one culture/population within the other, separated by internal boundaries and living in ghettos or enclaves, but still with diverse contacts and influence across the borders. Doubtless, the surrounding culture will rub off on the islands, but they try to maintain their own integrity. Jewish ghettos in Europe and the Arab world (e.g., Morocco) and African-American populations living in segregated America are examples, although not borderland cases; Jewish settlements in Palestine are “reverse” examples, in which the “ghettos” or enclaves are implanted to displace and control the majority. The nobility of Lusignan Cyprus in the first half of the second millennium provides a softer example.

3c. Finally, the layered model espouses horizontal rather than vertical separations, imposing a dominant population from one culture over another of a different culture. Colonizations, especially settler colonies, are examples, as in the Maghrib between the European and the Arab world; Apartheid South Africa is a fine example, but only a borderland in the extremely symbolic sense, since it did not lie geographically between two power centers but was itself such a center. The Palestinian West Bank combines the last two into a spotty-layered model, and many other realities are in fact messy combinations of the neat types identified above.

However, despite the particular markings of the object, one characteristic overshadows and contains all of the models—the fact that borderlanders constitute an identifiable unit unto themselves, distinct from the populations further back from the line by their experiences and their identity. This idea of a distinct population is the first message of this wide collection, and it informs all the subsequent analysis, extending to the policy implications in the final chapter.

DYNAMICS AND REACTIONS

These models—Weber’s ideal types or Barth’s (1964; 1969, 20) gross simplifications—are only snapshots of a doubly dynamic reality that never stays still. At best, they refer to a side of the border or assume a symmetry that is not likely to exist. Even in the strictest approximations of the models to reality, the fit is never tight and the components never impermeable, hermetically sealed from
each other, unproductive of crossings and interactions. Nor is the situation static, as the snapshot tempts us to believe. Borderlands are always in movement from here to there and within the here and there of the moment. The second part of the thesis and novelty of this work is the identification of movement rather than any particular model as the characteristic of borderlands. Borderland reality is a moving machine at any moment, and it changes its movements as it moves through time, in motion both synchronically and diachronically. Because of the complexity of the machine, it is tempting to revert to a picture of incomprehensible chaos, a seemingly endless number of factors locked together, describable but unordered. Instead, that movement has to be captured in identification and description by particular terms of analysis. Three dimensions need to be handled in the analysis—time, space, and activity.

Time, first. The picture of a borderland over a five-hundred-year time period will naturally be different in its detail from a picture of a decade, and the depiction of a span of time will vary from a comparative analysis of two time periods at either end of the span, just as the examination of a machine will differ from the study of a mill and that from the analysis of an industry.

Space is the second aspect in the dimensions of analysis. Borderlands involve local interactions as a primary focus, but they in turn are affected by relations with and between the power centers (generally, states) that purport to govern them, and these in their turn are affected by the larger regional or global order, often reaching directly into the local interactions. Indeed, no standard dimensions identify a borderland; they are self-defining and can even be multiply defined for portrayal or analysis, containing themselves in larger or smaller regions like Russian Matrushka dolls. Perhaps confusingly, the lessons of the analysis can vary with the focus within the same region. Is the best subject for understanding the Cerdanya valley in Catalonia (Sahlins 1989) or Catalonia itself (Douglass 1998), a neighborhood in Cyprus or Cyprus itself (Schryver 2006a), Transnistria or Moldova (Dawisha and Parrott 1997; Hopmann 2001), (Trans-)Jordan or Cis-Jordan (West Bank)? In fact, any borderland will embody characteristics of all three conditions, displaying component integrity, internal separation, and external differentiation, at the same time. While the levels of analysis in time and in focus should complement each other, they may also reveal tensions that are part of their dynamic. Since it is not only the nature but the source of the dynamics of borderlands that is sought, these analytical relationships will be important and elucidating.

A third type of variable concerns the nature of the interaction that is the
focus of the analysis. While social science contains a vigorous rivalry over compet-
ing claims for decisive terms of analysis, a number of facets of life in the borderlands stand out as particularly important. On the local level, these involve various dimensions of participation such as economic production and exchange (trade), land ownership, social ownership (identity), rule, geographic location (fixed and migratory), communications (language), and security. On the national level, they involve, particularly, pressures to “modernize” (in the meaning of the times) and to centralize power; the first involves relations between the external/global level and the regional level, whereas the second is internal to the regional power centers. Hanging over all is the mythological level, the way borderlands are perceived from either side of the dividing line. While different apperceptions of the dynamics of borderland life may emphasize different terms of analysis from this list, the others need to be kept in sight to keep single factor analysis under control. However important a single term of analysis may be and however necessary it may be to emphasize its role to restore an analytical balance or introduce a new perspective, it is the balance and interaction among variables that provides a full understanding of the borderland dynamics. The broad range of studies in this collection represents an attempt to incorporate as many of these variables as possible.

The epistemological result of these sets of components of borderland life and analysis is a Rubic cube of interactions, complex but limited, spinning its own planes and traveling through time (there are limitations to any analogy). A number of salient variables as identified interact internally, among themselves, and between levels, to constitute a dynamic that characterizes the historic subject. However, this fluid structure only sets up the possibility of identifying some salient interactions that stand out in determining the dynamics of borderland life. The third part of this work’s thesis is that in their characteristic mobility, borderlands always prepare for the next move at the same time as they respond to the last one—not just movement, but movement in response to a particular situation, producing pressures for a future situation. The studies collected here offer a step toward understanding these interactions. No claim can be made for universality, but only for windows that permit better-informed observation and understanding of the dynamics of life in borderlands. There are doubtless examples and perhaps universes beyond the cases presented here. But the examples, ranging over four millennia from the twentieth century BC to the twentieth century AD, show at least that the three defining characteristics—a
population on the margins of power, traversed by a political boundary, living internally and externally dynamic relations—encompass an area of human activity and scientific analysis that continues across history and is therefore relevant to understanding events yet to come.

One major source of dynamics in the borderlands derives from the evolution of power centers controlling the borders. When a power center (state) seeks to grow, consolidate its authority, or modernize (in the understanding of the times), it is likely to harden its borders, centralize economic supplies and exchanges, inhibit local border control mechanisms and transborder cooperation, and introduce conflict between the two sides of the borderland. The result on either side is a heightened sense of differentiation and identity, an increase in migration and relocation, and a growth of nostalgia for the territorial expression of identity.

A strong power center bent on controlling its side of the borderlands is bound to send “foreign” populations to occupy its (often already populated) territory and confirm its consolidation, as the colonizers and newly formed United States did in North America and the Ottomans did in the Balkans. These populations can be military and border guards, administrators, and settlers, whose authority depends on their ability to resist assimilation (in either direction) with the local population. But the effect of such foreign implantations often works in two opposite directions—to create the very opposite of the separation and control that they were sent to achieve, and to provoke violence and resistance to imposed internal changes, as seen in late nineteenth-century Balkans and Yemen in Isa Blumi’s chapter. Both violent resistance and the creation of new social categories create the seeds for heightened local identities and eventual separatism.

However, if this physical, economic, and identitarian separation is not achieved completely, as is likely, the old habits of transborder communication, the need for economic exchanges, differentiation within the unhomogenized population, and reactions against the efforts to create a black-and-white borderland are likely to produce new groups working to tie the two halves of the borderland together. These include dayworkers, smugglers and bandits, traders, indigenous minorities, and tax collectors, among others. Their activities will prompt further conflicts within the borderlands and will either be reduced if the power center is effectively consolidated or create a new type of relations within the borderlands, further weakening the state. As African states attempt
to bring their writ to their borders and control permeability and profitable smuggling, they risk riling up separatist identities and troubling current acceptance of the borders, as Judith Vorrath's chapter indicates.

A weak power center will tend either to leave its borderlands alone on their own or to make compensating efforts to assert what little power is left to secure its borderlands. It may delegate security and other functions to local authorities, as along the nineteenth-century AD Ottoman borderlands, or make preemptive raids along the border to keep potential adversaries off balance, as in nineteenth-century BC Egypt, or “leap the local” and invest in international norms, symbols, and lore to tighten their weak control, as in the African continent and the Jordan valley in the twentieth century, as discussed in Rachel S. Havrelock’s chapter. The Berlin Congresses of 1878—discussed by Blumi—and 1895 and the Dayton Conference of 1993, and the maps that followed them, discussed by İpek K. Yosmaoğlu, gave international legitimacy to dubious boundaries. If the opposing power center is weak too, the internal characteristics of the borderland, whether harmonious or conflictual, become dominant, local groups become salient, and functional specialization gives rise to local purveyors of products and activities that the power centers still require. If the opposing power center is strong, local autonomy in the borderland and indeed the border itself may be in danger; security means either bandwagoning with the stronger neighbor or finding a balancer from outside. A grey area between two weak power centers such as contemporary Eastern Congo or mid-nineteenth-century Texas is a vacuum that requires that the region either rise to the challenge of handling its own internal coherence and external security or call in assistance from an external protector, not too close but not too distant. A grey area between two strong power centers such as eighteenth-century Andorra or nineteenth-century Belgium is either the result of a protective pact or the preparation for an impending battlefield. The first contributes to the internal coherence of the area; the second tears it apart into union and rebel sympathizers in the border state.

Stepping down from the level of power centers, a second dynamic is triggered by sudden attempts to impose a new boundary on an old borderland, in the form of a ceasefire line, green line, or line of control. Typically, such a line attempts to arbitrate between competing claims from rival centers and overlapping loyalties within the borderland population and is often accompanied by a physical or virtual “national cleansing,” in which populations homogenize either by taking on the newly imposed loyalties or by moving. The Israelo-Palestinian
and Cyprus Green Lines, the Kashmir Line of Control, the Korean 38th Parallel corrected to the Ceasefire Line, the German Iron Curtain, the various Ottoman Balkan borders, and many others are diverse examples. The cases immediately recall that the imposed homogeneity is not only artificial but also incomplete and unstable in its attempt to construct identity and meaning. Competing with the state efforts to create new identities and their supporting social structures are the borderland peoples’ efforts to overcome the line, and this competition is the basis of the new dynamic.

“Green lines” create physical and social mobilities, quite the opposite of their intent. New refugees transport their territorial identity on their backs, and refugee camps become little homelands on the wrong side of the border. Leftover islands from either side reach back in space and memory across the new line. New professions, such as middlemen for commerce and communications and smugglers of goods and people, poke holes in the border that other new professions, such as guards and administrators, try to close. The authorities seek to overcome the new artificiality of the border by giving it civilizational meaning as the end of the world, with nothing on the other side, loading it with significance that would not be necessary if the border were more natural. Pressures to soften the border only became reasons to harden it.

Against these tensions, artificially imposed borders tend to be dismantled as dramatically as they were imposed, rather than gradually eroding. The flood released when the wall is torn down, however, does not wash away its traces; just as the field of the previous borderland was hard to fence definitively, so the imprint of the wall and the differences they created are difficult to erase. The Iron Curtain is gone, but there are still Östlis from the recovered territories, just as there were Östlanders from the lost territories after World War II.

A third source of dynamics and change is found in shifts in and interactions among horizontal divisions of class and other stratifications that arise in the borderlands and interact across the frontier. Most writing about borderlands, beginning with the anthropological tradition and the idea of social boundaries, has been a two-dimensional analysis emphasizing the vertical or ethnic divisions and relations within society. Much less attention has been paid to a three-dimensional analysis of horizontal or class divisions within the borderlands and then to their interaction with the vertical divisions and relations; Barth (1969, 27–28) treats “stratification” as a given, like geography. But all cannot be subsumed within vertical relations; to the contrary, it is often the horizontal position that gives role and meaning to the vertical divisions. Border-
lands have their own social stratification, one that typically incorporates some ethno-national elements in particular places in the strata. A three-dimension analysis is needed to comprehend change and dynamics.

Local relations in the borderlands frequently replicate in the small Barrington Moore's classic dynamic between central authority (monarchy), landowners (barons), and commercial forces, adding a fourth force of labor to replace peasantry in modern times. An additional element to complete the array of players is the military, who are particularly important actors in borderlands; regime overthrow by dissatisfied military forces stationed in the borderlands is a frequent phenomenon, as experiences from Caesar in Rome to Franco in Spain illustrate. In this schema, it is the particular alliances among forces that determine the social evolution and create particular reactions in the next round of history. Local dynamics can be quite independent of the larger national dynamics but can also be the tail that wags the national dog.

There are a number of possibilities for these dynamics. If the borderland elites or upper strata do well in relation to the power center, they can invade the capital, either to take over or to be assimilated. These were the outcomes for the Oranais in independent Algeria and the Phanariots in nineteenth-century Wallachia, respectively. Or they can stay at home, raising rivalries with the power center and eventually notions of autonomy and secession, usually because they feel they are not getting their due from the center and want to keep their own resources for themselves. This is what happened in recent times in Kurdistan, Biafra and Katanga, Slovenia and Croatia, and the Baltic States. Horizontal relations can also determine the ways in which the borderlands will swing in relation to competing—bordering—power centers. The civil war in Northern Ireland is as much a class conflict as an ethnic or religious conflict, ultimately pitting demographic against economic power to decide whose borderland the territory will be. Socioeconomic changes through development raise the power of the workers; vertical consolidation through nationalism or ethnic solidarity comes as a natural reaction to the introduction of class consciousness and warfare, although lower-class ideological leaders may then seek support from excluded ethnicities. This is what happened in Catalonia at the end of the nineteenth century (Douglass 2002, 68–73). In another aspect of the modernization process, the classical struggle between the herders and the farmers, reinforced by social boundaries separating ethnic groups dominating each occupation, can escalate into genocide in the borderlands, as in the American West, Darfur (Haaland 1969), and Kivu, among many others. In all these cases, among others,
it is the interaction between vertical and horizontal divisions that provided the
dynamic of sociopolitical relations within the borderland, a process of move-
ment that could not be accounted for by one dimension of divisions alone.

CASES AND LESSONS

In an age of globalization, borderlands may seem to have gone the way of all
borders, overwhelmed by the penetrating effects of transnational actions. Yet
the following chapters convey two important lessons to the contrary. They tell
us first that borderlands maintain their own dynamics and identities against
some of both the most robust and most dissolving situations, and if these events
drawn from the distant or current past are not exact replicas of the new chal-
lenges and conditions of the near or distant future, they certainly cover the
gamut of possibilities in similarity to those in times to come. Then too, the fol-
lowing chapters show, in visions ranging from telescopic to microscopic, that
seemingly stable solutions drawn up in response to a past challenge bear within
them the elements of new challenges calling for new solutions—the theme of
this collective effort.

The collection of analyses in the first part focuses on borderlands as the
fringes of structures of power in evolution. The first moving picture, rather
broad in its range, comes from the second millennium before our era, along the
borders of the great—if not super—power of its time, Pharaonic Egypt. Miro-
slav Bártá of Charles University in Prague examines “Borderland Dynamics in
the Era of the Pyramid Builders in Egypt,” showing how efforts to shore up a
declining power were played out on the large swath of borderlands. The bor-
derland was part of Egyptian mythology, used physically and mythologically by
the great state to define itself, much as the Ottoman state or the Soviet Union
would later define themselves by their borders. Originally an interaction zone,
its permeability required a fortified line when the Asiatic influx appeared. But
as the state weakened, it first used a policy of preventive strike to discourage
neighbors from taking advantage of its weakness. When the power center then
collapsed, its structured borderlands collapsed with it, but economic, cultural,
and commercial traits began to develop within the prevailing anarchy that were
to define the upcoming centralized state and its borderlands in its new incar-
nation.

Nearly twenty centuries later, George Gavrilis of the University of Texas
at Austin and Isa Blumi of Georgia State University examine borderland